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Introduction
The integration of European capital markets aims at dismantling barriers to cross-border investment and increasing the liquidity of markets, leading to more dispersed and internationally diversified corporate ownership structures. At the same time the major objective of corporate governance reform in Europe is to enable shareholders' participation in, and impact on, corporate decision-making. Few observers note, however, that (other things being equal) dispersed international ownership structures can make shareholders' activism, less, not more, likely. One example of this problem is falling attendance rates at annual general meetings of shareholders. This paper claims that the development of effective and efficient technologies to help shareholders overcome the lack of proximity to companies is an often neglected but crucial factor in further capital market integration and corporate governance reform in Europe. Specifically the objective of the paper is to explore the role of Internet as a technology that enhances transparency of corporate governance but also enables proper functioning of dispersed, international shareholding structures.
The contribution of the paper is twofold: methodological and empirical. From the methodological point of view, the paper introduces Internet Based Corporate Governance (IBCG) rating -a system for the evaluation of the use of Internet in the governance of companies. The design of the system is based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the experience of voluntary codes in Europe, as well as the methodologies of corporate governance rating agencies. The system encompasses criteria with regard to
Shareholders, Transparency, Board of Directors, Executive Management and Technical
Accessibility. One feature that distinguishes our method is the focus on how effectively Internet is used in corporate governance. What matters here is not only whether certain information is disclosed on Internet, but also how it is disclosed, and whether it allows further manipulation and processing. Beyond the substance and methods of disclosure, the paper also considers the use of Internet for other corporate governance practices including voting, shareholders' meetings, and board meetings.
While the paper argues the necessity of effective and efficient use of Internet in corporate governance, it also considers the limits of Internet use. Examples include failures to replace actual shareholders' meetings with virtual meetings, the use of Internet as a smokescreen for bad corporate governance practices, and the use of Internet as a quick and 'shallow' improvement of the corporate governance rating of a company. Finally, the paper offers some speculations on the future of Internet and corporate governance by discussing the feasibility of new technologies dedicated to automatic corporate governance data processing that could provide a tool for instant comparisons and analysis, and enhance shareholders' activism.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by presenting the methodology of Internet Based Corporate Governance rating. The following chapter applies IBCG to rate the 20 largest British and Polish corporations. Next, the IBCG ratings of these companies are compared to their conventional corporate governance ratings. The final section summarizes our results and presents their implications as well as suggestions for future research. (Lattemann, 2005) .
Internet Based Corporate Governance Rating -methodology
In order to construct our rating a detailed review of existing corporate governance ratings and relevant literature was undertaken, with particular attention paid to rating companies with global scope, including Governance Metrics International (GMI), Standard & Poors and the Institute of Shareholder Services (ISS) Bradley, 2004; Strenger, 2004) . The review of literature on ratings led us to the following conclusions.
First, all available ratings aim at evaluating overall corporate governance. This is understandable, since at the basic level investors as users of ratings require information on whether a company has poor or good governance. The problem, however, is that the existing rating systems rely on assumptions about many aspects of corporate governance, the impact of which is far from proven conclusively by research. To give an example, typically rating systems consider any anti-takeover provisions as bad corporate governance, while research suggests that some protections can enhance the position of shareholders in the target (Becht et al., 2003) . As another example, the separation of CEO and the chairman of the board is considered a must, while again there is no conclusive research on the issue.
Another common problem of corporate governance rating systems is that while they consider transparency as a fundamental and obvious feature of good governance, their own rating methodology is far from transparent. A notable exception here is The German Scorecard for Corporate Governance (DVFA, 2000) . As a response to these problems in this paper we offer a specialized -in contrast to conventional overall ratings -fully transparent rating based on the use of Internet as a tool of information and communication, and a building block of good corporate governance, which is beyond controversy. For example, we do not intend to evaluate whether the number of independent directors in a company is sufficient, but we evaluate whether a company discloses relevant information on board independence. In practice, while conducting the rating many rating agencies consider the lack of information on a given aspect of corporate governance as evidence of bad corporate governance. There are several areas of IBCG in which both the British and the Polish companies perform poorly. First of all it is rare to disclose the extended share structure, with very few companies providing information on shares held by the company itself or its employees.
Moreover, not a single company provides direct contact details for executive managers or 3 Secure Socket Layer -encryption protocol commonly used in Internet banking due its reliability and connection security. In that case SSL has another advantage -the viewer has confidence both in connecting to a specially authorized web source and in downloading an annual report from a reliable source. 4 ICSA (2000, p 9, 10) 
Internet Based Corporate Governance compared to conventional ratings
In this section we compare the IBCG of the largest 20 British and Polish companies to their conventional ratings, i.e. overall ratings that evaluate the entire range of corporate 6 The criteria used in the New Technologies in IBCG rating were the following: searchability of the statute, accessibility for impaired shareholders, broadcasts of CEO and Chairman speeches, general debate or the entire AGM on internet, the availability of shareholder newsletter, RSS notification, webcasts, tools for the analysis of stock price evolution, support for main browsers, compliance with web standards, printability, connection security, site map, search engine, personalisation, searchability of the annual report, spreadsheet version of accounts and XBRL usage. Negative correlations for British companies compared to positive correlations for Polish companies may be explained by the structure of conventional ratings applied in the analysis.
8 It is worth noting that the coefficient of correlation between GMI and CGQ for the UK companies was as low as 0,2. Source: Based on authors' own data and data from Bloomberg and www.pfcg.org.pl
Implications and conclusions
In this paper, in order to highlight the significance of Internet in corporate governance, we have offered a novel Internet Based Corporate Governance Rating, focusing on the disclosure of corporate governance on Internet and the use of Internet for communication with
shareholders. In addition, applying the IBCG to rate the largest British and Polish corporations, we have shown that while Polish companies generally lag behind the British firms in terms of corporate governance disclosure on Internet, there are exceptions, where
Polish companies make a better use of Internet as a communication tool. Finally, we have compared the IBCG Rating to conventional corporate governance ratings, and found low correlations between them, which underscores the distinctive character of the IBCG.
Let us consider the implications of our results at a macro and micro level. At the start of the twenty first century we have been witnessing the emergence of a global market for corporate governance (see Clark and Wójcik, 2007) . One meaning of this market is that investors are increasingly aware of corporate governance as an important part of investment risk, and tend to discount the value of badly governed companies. The other meaning of corporate governance globalisation is the emergence of a global market for corporate governance related services for investors and companies alike, with the latter being increasingly aware of corporate governance as a risk affecting corporate performance and integrity. Our argument in this paper is that the development of a global market for corporate governance is enabled by Internet as a medium of information and communication.
Supporting the development of a global marketplace for corporate governance, (Wójcik, 2006) . At least partly, these results could be explained by a growing awareness among firms of the significance of public disclosure for corporate governance.
Second, there are direct costs of creating and maintaining corporate governance websites and related software. Our knowledge of creating and managing corporate websites, however, suggests that these costs are relatively low. Third, there are indirect costs of using Internet in corporate governance in cases where poor communication with shareholders and low level of disclosure protects the private benefits of control accruing to management, directors, controlling owners or related parties. It is this third reason, arguably more important than the other two, which implies that the IBCG Rating can be useful for investors and analysts in estimating corporate governance risk. To be sure we do not idealise the role of Internet in corporate governance. Virtual AGMs and in particular board meetings are unlikely and should not replace physical gatherings of people, just like a proper audit cannot take place without auditors spending some time on the premises of the audited company. Control based on virtual interaction is a complement not a perfect substitute for physical interaction.
In order to continue the project on Internet and corporate governance, and as a followup on this paper, we are in the process of developing a standard, which will allow an efficient way of "tagging" specific corporate governance data in the sea of corporate information available on Internet. This involves the creation of software that will facilitate quick harvesting of corporate governance data, while respecting different ways in which individual companies organise their Internet content and layout. It is intended that the users of the software will be able to create their own customised corporate governance ratings based on the actual up-to-date content of corporate websites.
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